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The Politics of Immigration Control in Britain and Germany:
Subnational Politicians and Social Movements
Roger Karapin
Abstract
Political backlash against immigrant minorities and restrictive immigration policies have
increased in western Europe. Most explanations of the adoption of restrictions on immigration
have focused on ethnic competition for material resources and on national political factors. An
alternative theory of political mobilization and restrictive policy changes argues that pressure
from subnational politicians and social movement organizations and signals from dramatic anti-
immigrant events such as riots lead national elites to infer that public interest in anti-immigration
policies is intense enough to justify a break with liberal policies. This theory is tested against four
cases in Britain and Germany, where the hypothesized processes are observed despite very
different socioeconomic and political-institutional contexts.
Postwar immigration has caused ethnic minorities to become established in most West
European countries, and political backlashes against them have increased in the past few decades.
 Why does national-level mobilization against immigration develop and sometimes result in more
restrictive immigration policies?  Theories of immigration-control policies have answered these
questions largely in terms of economic grievances and national political institutions.  By contrast,
this article offers a theoretical account of how anti-immigration mobilization grows and
influences national policy through the leadership of subnational politicians and social-movement
organizations; it further argues that their actions are substantially autonomous from
socioeconomic factors.1  The method used here is a comparison following a "most different
systems" design, in which four cases of immigration restrictions under very different background
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conditions -- in Britain and Germany -- are analyzed in order to identify necessary conditions.2
"Immigration" here refers to the entry into a country of people who are seen as belonging
to ethnic groups distinct from the native population and who remain in the receiving country for
many years.  "Anti-immigration mobilization" consists of public statements and actions intended
to gain political support for policies that will restrict immigration.  Policies are restrictive if they
intend and achieve reductions in immigration rates relative to previous policies.
Economic Grievances and National Political Factors
Economic-grievance explanations of immigration control posit that immigration and
unemployment cause anti-immigration mobilization based on political actors' material interests. 
Borrowing from ethnic-competition theory, one strand of this work holds that immigration and
economic downturns increase competition for jobs, housing, and social-welfare spending, leading
voters who belong to the ethnic-majority group to demand restrictions on immigration.3  A
second strand posits that business associations are strongly pro-immigration during periods of
economic expansion and become ambivalent or uninterested during recessions, while labor
unions are divided during economic expansions and become more strongly anti-immigration
during contractions.4  While socio-economic conditions have important effects on anti-
immigration politics, they do not comprise an adequate theory.5  The mechanisms through which
these factors act are unclear, and there is much they cannot explain about cross-country
differences in restrictiveness and the timing of policy changes.
As a supplement to economic-grievance explanations, many writers have analyzed the
role of national-level political factors in immigration restrictions.  They hold that factors centered
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on electoral politics create and encourage anti-immigration mobilization and the adoption of
restrictive policies.  Since the international system in the postwar period has generally supported
liberal immigration policies, analysts have appropriately looked to domestic factors in order to
locate the impetus for immigration restrictions.  Some argue that the availability of referenda,
federalism, and single-member districts in national elections ease access to the political agenda
for those pressing for restrictions.6  Others argue that fragmented party systems allow smaller
parties, which are less divided on immigration issues than the mass parties of the center-left and
center-right, to give voice to anti-immigration interests in parliaments and in governing
coalitions.7  Still others argue that national political cultures, e.g. of settler societies vs. ethno-
nationalist Western Europe, or ius soli vs. ius sanguinis legal traditions, decisively shape
contemporary governments' responses to immigration, especially their citizenship policies.8 
While these national political factors may be useful in particular cases and in Anglo-American
vs. West European comparisons, they are unsatisfactory in several ways:  there are now so many
of them that as a class of explanations they are nearly unfalsifiable; important cases of relatively
successful anti-immigration politics, such as Britain and France, run counter to most of them; and
they cannot explain the timing of anti-immigration mobilization and restrictive policies.
In these regards, national political processes are more promising as factors to place at the
center of explanations of immigration restrictions.  These factors include increased voter
volatility, the decline of mass parties' electoral strength, the narrowness of the national governing
coalition's parliamentary majority, and successes by far-right parties in national elections.9 
However, the British adoption of immigration controls in 1962, when the Conservatives enjoyed
a 100-seat majority and the party system was stable, is a difficult case for these explanations.
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Party competition is more likely to help account for such difficult cases.  Dietrich
Thränhardt argues that conservative parties in Britain, France, and Germany have repeatedly used
race-related issues in efforts to draw voters from the center-left parties, despite very different
levels and rates of immigration.10  This implies the need to analyze what, besides changes in
immigration and unemployment, could influence national politicians toward anti-immigration
positions.
Subnational Politicians and Social Movements
The argument in this article builds on work which explains immigration politics in terms
of the actions of subnational politicians and social movements, including violence against
immigrants.11  So far, these factors have not been theoretically elaborated and related to the
socioeconomic and national-political approaches.12  I aim to do so here in terms of five
hypotheses, which draw on key insights provided by studies of immigration politics and political-
process theories of social movements.13
Hypothesis 1:  The Partial Autonomy of Anti-Immigration Politics  The first hypothesis is
that socioeconomic conditions underlying ethnic competition are not closely related to political
mobilization which achieves immigration restrictions, although there is some relationship. 
Socioeconomic conditions create the potential for mobilization which is strong enough to achieve
immigration restrictions, but such mobilization does not automatically develop; its timing,
location, intensity, and protagonists are shaped more by political processes than by socio-
economic ones.  The translation of economic grievances into political action is hindered by key
features of immigration politics:  national politicians from the parties of government tend to
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maintain a consensus on liberal policies; the geographic concentration of immigrants limits the
number of native citizens who feel threatened by immigration; and actors trying to raise issues
which elites exclude from the political agenda have collective-action problems.14
Hypothesis 2:  Subnational Mobilization  The second hypothesis is that anti-immigration
mobilization by state or local politicians precedes and influences national campaigns for
immigration restrictions, as well as any restrictions adopted.  The reasoning for this hypothesis is
as follows.  Anti-immigration positions have a potential electoral payoff, but are unlikely to
receive a serious national hearing unless actors outside the circle of national political elites make
them appear to be pressing public problems and therefore electorally important issues. 
Majorities or large minorities of the population in most West European countries have anti-
immigrant attitudes; for example, 40-65% of citizens in eight out of twelve countries recently
agreed that "there are too many foreigners" in their country.15  But the issue of immigration
control is seldom a high priority for voters, and the issue's salience depends largely on whether
politicians put public attention on it.  National politicians are unlikely to do this because they
usually participate in a consensus in which they tacitly agree to uphold liberal immigration
policies and not to appeal to the anti-immigrant sentiments of the public.16  National politicians
are reluctant to break the taboo against apparently racist or xenophobic positions for many
reasons.  Business prefers liberal immigration policies, and anti-immigration statements might
benefit the far right, stir up racism and racist violence, anger foreign governments, and tarnish the
country's international reputation for liberalism.  A politician or party which is seen as breaking
the taboo might be excluded from coalition government or party leadership.
Subnational politicians are more likely to introduce anti-immigration positions to the
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agenda, partly because they are less bound by the terms of the liberal consensus.  They are more
distant from responsibility for the national state's image abroad, they communicate less with
national political elites and more with local leaders and ordinary citizens, and they may see anti-
immigration politics as a potential means of gaining national attention and enhancing their
careers -- even if it is also a potentially disreputable and risky path.  Furthermore, many
immigrant groups are concentrated in urban and industrial areas, as are the native working-class
populations who might compete with immigrants for jobs and housing and who are
disproportionately prone to vote for anti-immigration parties.17  This geographic concentration
implies that anti-immigration mobilization may occur in certain localities although the country as
a whole is not strongly affected.
Hypothesis 3:  Social-Movement Activity  The third hypothesis is that subnational politicians
often act under pressure from anti-immigration social movements based at the local or state level.
 By social movements, I mean sustained efforts by challengers, i.e. those who lack routine access
to authoritative decision-makers, to mobilize a constituency in order to achieve a public goal. 
Their efforts usually include activities, such as petitions, demonstrations, or violence, which
disrupt the normal routines of electoral and interest-group politics.  Social-movement
organizations are challengers which possess a degree of organization; they can be formal
organizations or loosely organized groups.18  In anti-immigration politics, relevant social-
movement groups and activities include public meetings and petitions by anti-immigration
residents groups, violence against immigrants by native youth groups, and local election
campaigns by far-right parties.  In both Britain and Germany, far-right parties are clearly
outsiders to the political game, unable to participate in coalitions; hence they are social-
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movement organizations.  For the reasons given under the second hypothesis, anti-immigration
social movements are more likely to emerge and target politicians at the local or state level than
at the national level.
The argument here contrasts sharply with that of Jeannette Money, who holds that the
actions of local politicians reflect the demands of voters, which in turn reflect local immigration,
unemployment, and other economic conditions.19  My argument is that these kinds of economic
factors do not determine the timing and location of anti-immigration mobilization at the state or
local level.  Rather, the responses of subnational politicians are strongly influenced by actual or
potential social-movement activities, which in turn depend on political processes (see hypothesis
5 below) that cannot be reduced to socio-economic factors.
Hypothesis 4:  Dramatic Events  The fourth hypothesis is that national politicians are extremely
responsive to local or state-level events which major news media report to be dramatic
expressions of citizens' opposition to immigrants.  Such dramatic events include mass violence
against immigrants and electoral victories by candidates or parties which use anti-immigration
appeals in unusually overt, emotional, or racist ways.  Social-movement organizations can be
important in initiating such dramatic events because they are not bound by the liberal consensus
on immigration.  Furthermore, social movements can attract publicity to the anti-immigration
cause while allowing politicians to play the role of the moderate seeking compromise rather than
of the racist trying to fan the flames of discontent.
Dramatic anti-immigrant events can influence national politicians to abandon the liberal
consensus by convincing them that anti-immigrant sentiment is strong enough to pose an
electoral threat or payoff.  The gap between elites' liberal consensus and the public's anti-
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immigrant attitudes makes national politicians deeply ambivalent about immigration.  Above all,
politicians have poor information about the extent to which the native population perceives
ethnic competition and immigration to be serious problems.  Reliable information about
constituents' preferences is especially difficult to get in this policy area because voters as well as
their leaders often regard openly expressed anti-immigrant sentiment as racist or xenophobic and
therefore taboo.  Yet when leading news media put attention on anti-immigrant events, it is likely
that many national politicians will revise their estimates of the intensity of constituents'
preferences at the same time, which makes possible new alignments and shifts in policy.
Hypothesis 5:  The Politics of Social-Movement Mobilization  Building on theories of social
movements, the fifth hypothesis is that social-movement activities against immigrants depend on
both favorable subnational political opportunity structures and available social-movement
organizations.  Favorable political opportunity structures are those which, following Tilly, create
a relatively high probability that a group's interests will be advanced ("opportunity") and
relatively low costs or risks of taking collective action ("facilitation" rather than "repression").20 
For local anti-immigrant movements, two key elements of a favorable political opportunity
structure are the availability of potential allies among local or state politicians, who may take
anti-immigrant or anti-immigration positions publicly, and passivity by police when anti-
immigrant violence is initiated.  Social-movement organizations are important for mobilization
because they help to solve the free-rider problem of collective action; even small, informally
organized groups can do so by socially rewarding and sanctioning their members.21  But the
availability of anti-immigration residents associations, far-right parties, and racist youth groups




The nature of these hypothetical factors dictates studying a small number of cases in some
depth.  To test the five hypotheses, I selected cases on the dependent variable and sought to
maximize the differences between the cases on a large number of contextual variables, an
appropriate approach when testing for hypothetically necessary conditions.22  Therefore I chose
two country-cases as contexts in which to identify more temporally bound cases of anti-
immigration mobilization leading to restrictive policies:  the politics of Caribbean and South
Asian immigration to Britain (1958-1965), and the politics of immigration by political-asylum
seekers from Africa, Asia, Turkey, and Eastern Europe to Germany (1980-1993).  Asylum
seekers typically were able to remain in Germany for five to ten years while their cases were
decided and often could remain on humanitarian grounds even if their applications were denied;
hence they are immigrants in the sense of this article.23
These country-cases meet the two main criteria of the research design.  First, they include
some of the most important instances of restrictive policies in Western Europe during the
postwar period, which resulted from some of the largest and most public anti-immigration
mobilizations by national politicians.  Both country-cases began with unusually liberal
immigration policies based on strong ideological commitments, which were reversed after major
episodes of anti-immigration politics.  In Britain, the traditional right of all Commonwealth
citizens to enter Britain freely, recently reaffirmed in the 1948 Nationality Act,24 was restricted
for the first time by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1962; controls were tightened further
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in 1965.  In Germany, the extraordinarily generous rights for seekers of political asylum, which
were anchored in the constitutional Basic Law, were limited by visa requirements and a ban on
employment in 1980 and more sharply by a constitutional amendment in 1993.25  In both
country-cases, restrictions were made easier by shifts in international relations:  in Britain by the
declining importance of the Commonwealth in strategic thinking and in Germany by the end of
the Cold War and hence of the anti-communist rationale for a liberal asylum policy.  But these
international changes were only permissive, and do not explain why massive domestic anti-
immigration mobilization occurred and changed national policy in these countries, often against
opposition by foreign allies and their advocates in the state.
Second, the anti-immigration mobilizations and policies of these two country-cases
occurred in such different contexts that any political processes which they have in common are
likely to be present in other cases of immigration restrictions in postwar Western Europe.  These
differences include socio-economic conditions:  the level of immigration (lower in Britain), types
of immigrants (laborers with jobs in Britain vs. asylum seekers receiving social assistance in
Germany), extent of immigrants' civil rights (much higher in Britain), previous experience with
non-European immigrants, and level of unemployment (both greater in Germany).  Political
differences are also large on several dimensions:  state structure (centralized and unitary in
Britain vs. decentralized federalism in Germany); electoral system and government formation
(majoritarian in Britain vs. proportional representation and coalition governments in Germany);
and party system (stable, two-party in Britain in the 1960s vs. a multi-party system with the large
parties declining in Germany in the 1980s and '90s).
Finally, there is an important difference between the immigration politics of the two
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countries.  Britain adopted comparatively tight restrictions on black immigration in the 1960s,
when black immigrants made up less than 0.5% of the population and unemployment rates were
below 3%.  By contrast, Germany has retained comparatively liberal policies toward foreign
workers, and sharply restricted the right to political asylum only in the 1990s.  The German
constitutional amendment came more than a decade after asylum applications had reached high
levels, the non-European population had reached 5% of the total, and structural unemployment
greater than 6% had become a feature of the economy.26  Subnational mobilization and social
movements can help explain why Britain acted so early and Germany acted so late.
British Cases:  Restricting Black Immigration, 1958-1965
The 1960s controls in Britain targeted the "blacks" who had been immigrating from the
Caribbean, India, and Pakistan since the mid-1950s.  The 1962 Act required citizens of
Commonwealth states to obtain work vouchers from the Home Office before entering Britain;
this led to immediate declines in black immigration.27  The Labour Party's vocal opposition to the
1962 Act, which secured exemptions for workers' dependents and students, contrasted sharply
with its later behavior in government.  Instead of replacing the Immigrants Act through voluntary
agreements with former colonies, as promised in its 1964 election platform and campaign,
Harold Wilson's government accepted the Act and moved in August 1965 to sharply reduce the
number of work vouchers.28
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The Politics of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1958-1962  This Act was passed as the
result of a cluster of dramatic events and a Conservative Party decision.  In 1958, anti-black riots
in two cities put the issue of immigration control on the political agenda for the first time since
World War Two.  Three years later, the Conservative government of Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan decided to introduce immigration-control legislation, which the government passed
the next year with the support of its large parliamentary majority.  Hence I will explain the riots
and the Conservative government's decision, as well as why anti-immigration forces became
strong enough to pass legislation in 1962 rather than 1958.
Confirming the dramatic-event hypothesis, the 1958 riots initiated a public debate on
controls which broke with a decade of inattention to the issue by government and opposition
leaders.29  In late August and early September, large crowds of white people in Nottingham and
London (Notting Hill section) massed against black residents, mostly West Indians.  Over one
thousand people gathered and threatened blacks for two nights in Nottingham, while hundreds of
people in London attacked blacks for three consecutive nights in the streets and in their homes.30
 Although leading national politicians denounced the violence after the fact, especially
Conservatives claimed that immigration was responsible for the riots, and the issue of
immigration control was debated in national politics for several months.31  Alec Douglas-Home
(Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations and later Prime Minister) called for limits on
West Indian immigration, and the annual Conservative party conference passed a resolution in
favor of immigration control.  However, since grass-roots mobilization in 1958 was limited to
the two riots, only a few MPs became intensely concerned with immigration control; in the end,
the Home Secretary opposed controls and there was no change in policy.  Yet the riots put the
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attention of national party leaders on opinion polls which showed 80% of the public supported
immigration controls.
In turn, the riots in Nottingham and London would not have occurred without the actions
of social-movement groups and facilitation by police.  By early Summer 1958, active groups of
Teddy Boys, young working-class males who were distinguished by their long coats and
"bootlace ties," were active in both neighborhoods.32  Moreover, Notting Hill and its
surroundings also had far-right organizations and activity, including the headquarters of the
White Defence League and many members of the Union Movement led by the fascist Oswald
Mosley.  Mosley's supporters held meetings on street corners in Notting Hill earlier in the year,
and during the riots their speeches and leaflets urged whites to take action against blacks.33  In
both localities, Teds and others began attacks on blacks earlier in the summer, and the police did
not step in.  The lack of state repression emboldened potential white attackers, so that when
sexual jealousies led to small fights, these petty disputes became pretexts for mobilizing large
crowds to menace and attack blacks.  The police remained reserved or gave in to the mob's
wishes in London; in Nottingham, by contrast, police intervened strongly on the first night of
rioting and prevented large-scale attacks.
The political-autonomy hypothesis is also supported by this case.  Although the riots
began in poor neighborhoods and their timing may have been affected by the 1958 recession, the
downturn was mild and national unemployment rose only to 2.2%.34  Black immigration was
even less closely linked to rioting.  Only five out of sixteen cities which had substantial West
Indian populations by 1962 experienced anti-black riots during 1948-1965, and none had riots
nearly as severe as Notting Hill's.35  Nor were the riots triggered by large concentrations or rapid
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influxes of blacks.  Less than 1% of Nottingham's population was black in 1958, and the London
riots began in a neighborhood with only a small number of black residents.36  Moreover, the riots
occurred during a decline in the national immigration rate, and the numbers of West Indians in
Nottingham were stagnant during 1958.37
Changes in socioeconomic conditions had little independent influence on the
immigration-control debate and legislation.  Policy-makers responded in part to a sharp
immigration increase in 1960-1961, but the increase was largely a product of the debate on
immigration control begun in 1958; West Indians and especially South Asians were rushing to
get into Britain before the door was closed.38  The rhythms of the immigration debate followed
the business cycle to some extent, peaking during the recession years 1958 and 1961 as well as in
the boom years 1964-1965.39  But the political business cycle and liberal consensus contributed
to this correlation more than did ethnic competition.  Since the major parties tried to keep the
issue out of party competition in elections before 1964, they backed off calls for immigration
control before the 1959 general election.  At the same time, the government used macroeconomic
instruments to ensure an economic boom in order to improve its chances at the polls.40
Examining the politics inside the Conservative Party during this period shows that
dissatisfaction with black immigrants was translated into national anti-immigration politics
through local Conservative party organizations and locally active social-movement organizations.
 The turning point was the October 1961 Conservative Party conference, where thirty-nine anti-
immigration resolutions were presented by local party groups, compared with fewer than ten such
resolutions in each of the preceding years.  The resolutions signaled local dissatisfaction which
might be large enough to have consequences at the next general election.  The Home Secretary,
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Butler, voiced agreement with the local organizations' complaints, and three weeks later the
government announced it would seek immigration controls.  The lobbying work of the
Birmingham Immigration Control Association (BICA), an upstart group based in local residents
associations, had helped to prepare the Conservative Party for this decision.  BICA collected
55,000 signatures on anti-immigration petitions, and mobilized massive postcard campaigns
against local Conservative organizations in 1961.41
The Politics of Smethwick and Labour's About-Face, 1964-1965  The radical shift in Labour's
position on immigration began in 1963, as party leaders tried to create a bipartisan consensus on
immigration issues before the next election.  However, it was accelerated and ensured by the
interpretation of one dramatic event:  the 1964 general election result in the constituency of
Smethwick (Birmingham).42  There, the Conservative upstart Peter Griffiths ran a strongly anti-
immigration campaign and defeated Patrick Gordon Walker, who had been an important pro-
immigration spokesperson for Labour.  The result of this election, as well as Walker's defeat in
an ensuing byelection at Leyton (London), was devastating for the pro-immigration position.43  In
a confirmation of the dramatic-event hypothesis, the Smethwick result was interpreted as a signal
of broadly based demands for immigration control.
Yet the Smethwick result was largely the result of exceptional anti-immigration activity
by local social-movement organizations and Conservative politicians.  Indeed, Smethwick
conforms to a pattern present in six constituencies where anti-immigration candidates did well in
the 1964 election.  First, previous activity by social-movement organizations was necessary for
successful anti-immigration campaigns in the 1964 election.  In at least five of the six
constituencies, the 1964 election campaign was preceded by several years of anti-immigration
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activity by BICA, far-right parties, or other organizations.  In Smethwick itself, a branch of the
BICA was formed in 1961, and it worked to raise awareness of immigration through letters to the
editor, newspaper reporting, and a series of well-attended public meetings.  In response to BICA's
efforts, the local Conservative leader Peter Griffiths began for the first time to use the anti-
immigration rhetoric which helped him win in 1964.  Moreover, Smethwick's local elites
provided a favorable opportunity structure for the BICA challenge, as a Conservative city
councillor and a local newspaper owned by a Conservative activist provided the group with early
support.44
Second, these social-movement organizations spurred candidates to use aggressive local
anti-immigration election campaigns, which were successful in these six cases.  Anti-
immigration Conservatives did well in the three Birmingham constituencies where they used the
immigration issue aggressively; similarly, minor parties did well with strongly anti-immigration
campaigns in three London areas.45  The variation in local politicians' electoral campaign
strategies and their success rates is striking, and immigration levels do not account for the
differences.  These six constituencies had on average the same number of black immigrants as
six other constituencies where immigration was considered a potential issue but was in fact
muted or absent in the 1964 campaign.46
Jeannette Money argues that British politicians were responding to the voters in those
constituencies with large immigrant populations, and that the number of high-immigration
districts (about 50-100) was large enough to potentially cost the Conservatives their majority;
hence local pressures led to a rational shift in policy by the national party.47  But national
politicians acted with great autonomy from voters' demands on immigration in this period.  At
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least through the 1964 general election, the politicians were mostly ahead of, not following, the
electorate.  Moreover, although the increase in immigration led politicians to increasingly expect
a groundswell of anti-immigration demands by voters, anti-immigrant campaigns had electoral
payoffs in only a handful of places by 1964.
The lack of a groundswell is shown by the failure of the Conservatives to benefit
electorally from the issue.  Voters perceived that the Conservatives had taken a harder line than
Labour in the debate on the 1962 Act and in the 1964 election campaign, but most voters were
not interested in the immigration issue.  For example, in 1964, two major opinion surveys and a
postcard survey conducted by the BBC Election Forum failed to turn up immigration as an issue
that voters were concerned about.48  This may help explain why Conservative MP candidates lost
badly in three byelections which they fought on anti-immigration positions during 1961-1963.49 
Moreover, in one study of twenty-four high-immigration constituencies and another study of
seventeen constituencies where the immigration issue was important in the 1964 general election,
the Conservative Party did no better than its national average, a 3.2% loss to the Labour Party.50 
Finally, three of the four most prominent opponents of immigration did badly in the 1964
election.51  In this light, the Labour Party leadership seems to have been overinterpreted the
Smethwick result.
German Cases:  Restrictions of Asylum Rights, 1980-1993
Germany has experienced long-term immigration by many different groups in the postwar
period:  German refugees and displaced persons, "guest workers" from southern Europe and
Turkey, ethnic German resettlers from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and asylum
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seekers from a variety of countries.52  Although some immigration restrictions have been
imposed on all immigrating groups since the 1970s, the asylum seekers have been the targets of
the greatest political mobilization.53  Germany's unusually liberal asylum laws came to provide
an important mechanism for immigration after the end of guest-worker recruitment in 1973;
Article 16 of the constitution offered an unconditional right to asylum for politically persecuted
persons, which the courts interpreted to include extensive rights to judicial review.  As a result, it
was very difficult for government to deport a foreigner who had applied for asylum, and
Germany attracted over half of all asylum seekers who came to European Community countries
beginning in the late 1970s.54  Relatively effective restrictions could not be implemented without
a constitutional amendment, which depends on a legislative two-thirds majority and hence on
both the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and center-left Social Democratic Party
(SPD).  Strong reform was delayed until 1993 in part because of that supermajority requirement
and the SPD's ideological commitment to a strong asylum right; the latter was largely a legacy of
the party's experiences under the Third Reich, when some party leaders found asylum abroad. 
However, explaining the SPD's departure from tradition in voting for sharp asylum restrictions in
the 1990s requires analyzing subnational politics and social movements, factors which can also
help explain why constitutional reform was not possible earlier. 
The Politics of Asylum Restrictions, 198055  In March and June 1980, the federal government
announced visa requirements and an employment ban, measures which succeeded in sharply
reducing the entry rates of asylum seekers.  These restrictions were adopted after a large increase
in asylum applications in 1979-1980, especially from Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Turkey, and
Vietnam.56  Politicians from the center-right parties, the CDU and its affiliate in Bavaria, the
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Christian Social Union (CSU), insisted that most of these people were seeking economic
opportunities rather than fleeing political persecution.  The CSU leaders pressed for restrictions
more far-reaching than anything adopted before the 1990s, especially the authority to turn away
asylum seekers at the border, and center-right leaders began to speak of the need for
constitutional reform.  The timing of the restrictions adopted appears to contradict the political-
autonomy thesis.  But the leaders of the governing parties in Bonn, including the Foreign
Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (from the Free Democratic Party, FDP), and Interior Minister
Gerhard Baum (SPD), strongly resisted restrictions; they did so in part because the visa
requirements for citizens of Turkey would contravene an agreement with that country.57  A closer
look at the political processes shows that their resistance was overcome only because the large
increase in asylum applications coincided with election campaigns, subnational elite
mobilization, and the threat of social-movement activity.
In confirmation of the subnational mobilization thesis, state and local politicians led the
drive for asylum restrictions.  During 1978-1982, government officials in two southern states,
Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, led the push for restrictions in several ways:  by taking a harder
line in their state policies toward asylum seekers, pressing legislative initiatives in the Bundesrat,
publicizing the issue, and threatening to use it against the SPD in the federal election campaign
later that year.  In 1980, anti-immigration forces benefitted from the coincidence between the
influx of asylum applicants and scheduled elections for the Baden-Württemberg state parliament
and the federal Bundestag.  The Baden-Württemberg government, led by Lothar Späth (CDU),
announced in early February 1980 that it would implement a ban on employment and pay social
assistance mostly in kind rather than in cash; if the federal government failed to act, the state
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would also refuse to take its quota of asylum seekers.58  In response, just weeks before the
Baden-Württemberg state elections, the federal government announced visa requirements for all
citizens of Afghanistan, Ethiopian, and Sri Lanka.59
Anti-immigration pressure from local government also helped to put the issue on the top
of the political agenda in Bonn, and therefore helped force the federal government into adopting
restrictions before the October Bundestag election.  For example, soon after the Baden-
Württemberg election, Essen mayor Horst Katzor (SPD) drew headlines by refusing to accept
more asylum seekers.  Katzor was in a strong position to pressure the federal government; he
enjoyed the support of the association of municipalities in North-Rhine Westfalia, which he
headed, and had personal influence with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.60
Where local officials were reluctant to accept more asylum seekers, e.g. in many Baden-
Württemberg communities in 1980, they were motivated by potential social-movement activities
by local citizens groups and not merely by the costs created by the new arrivals.61  Since much of
the costs of social assistance and housing were reimbursed by state governments, finding suitable
housing in their jurisdiction for asylum seekers was the biggest challenge local government
faced.  It was made difficult by the reactions of German neighbors.  Based on prior experience,
local officials feared opposition from neighborhood groups if they tried to create asylum hostels
or seize school gymnasiums or private apartments.62
Anti-immigration mobilization was aided by West Germany's decentralized political
institutions, which give the states representation in the Bundesrat and make subnational
governments responsible for asylum seekers' housing and social assistance.  But these institutions
were not sufficient to produce mobilization or to guarantee the partial successes which it
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achieved in 1980.  Nor can the institutional framework explain why Baden-Württemberg and
Bavaria were far out in front of the other states in both their demands and their tactics, a pattern
which continued into the 1990s.  However, the center-right leaders of those states may have
responded to the threat of mobilization by far-right parties.  The neo-Nazi National Democratic
Party (NPD) did very well in the south in the late 1960s, gaining 7-10% of the vote, and in
Bavaria, intra-party tensions grew so serious that right-wing activists broke from the CSU to
form the radical-right Republikaner party in 1983.63
The 1980 German case also supports the dramatic-event thesis, although in a peculiar
way.  An SPD-FDP federal government adopted restrictions in 1980, despite its traditional
commitments to liberal asylum rights and good relations with Turkey, in part because the
government was concerned about potential social unrest.  Resistance by local governments had
created uncertainty about potential reactions from the German population.  Moreover, in their
statements, state prime minister Lothar Späth (CDU) and other Baden-Württemberg politicians
often used rhetoric which hinted at disorder and violence:  seizing school gyms to house asylum
seekers would lead to a "civil uprising"; too many asylum seekers might lead to "aggressions"; a
"social and ethnic explosive [was] being brewed together"; and federal inaction would necessitate
"civil-war-like discussions."64  Moreover, neo-Nazi violence and other activities had been rising
sharply since 1977, with the help of younger, more action-oriented recruits, and some of these
groups were beginning to target guest workers with violence.65
Although no dramatic anti-immigrant events occurred, in Spring 1980 it was difficult to
know what might happen at the grass roots, and therefore the fear of dramatic events was
sufficient to result in restrictions.  The Federal Interior Minister Baum was particularly concerned
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that the mobilization against asylum seekers could spill over into xenophobia expressed toward
guest workers.66  In an important Bundestag address in which he endorsed visa requirements for
asylum seekers, Baum stressed that guest workers were not a burden on the state, and argued that
the arrival of asylum seekers, by contrast, was a cause for concern.  The reason:  "emotions were
being awakened," he said, in part because some communities were overburdened, but also in part
because "emotions are being stirred up."67
The Politics of the Constitutional Amendment to the Asylum Article, 1991-1993  The
passage of Article 16a of the German Basic Law in May 1993 went far beyond the asylum
restrictions adopted in the 1980s.  By undercutting access to a full-fledged judicial appeals
process for most asylum seekers, it greatly reduced applications.68  As in 1980, the policy change
followed a major increase in immigration, including 300,000 asylum seekers a year during 1990-
1993; moreover, an economic contraction began in eastern Germany soon after economic
unification in 1990 and spread to western Germany.69  The new immigrants put economic
burdens on state and local governments, which contributed to the backlash against them.
Yet in many ways, the political process of backlash unfolded independently of the
economic grievances of the German population.  The legislative campaign against asylum rights
began well before the economic downturn in western Germany, and the campaign found little
resonance in eastern Germany, where the economy had collapsed in 1990.70  Furthermore,
politicians created most of the public interest in the asylum issue.  Voters in western Germany
came to see asylum as the country's dominant political problem, but the salience of the issue
swung wildly during 1989-1993, when each of the five peaks in public concern was preceded by
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an increase in the political debate on asylum rights.71
Moreover, asylum seekers were targeted while ethnic German resettlers were not, in part
because of the privileged political status of resettlers (who automatically received German
citizenship) and in part because of the legacies of previous policies toward asylum seekers.  The
1980 restrictions prevented asylum seekers from working, which burdened state and local
governments with social-assistance costs and increased popular resentments.  Also, in the 1980s,
state governments began to force asylum seekers to live in government hostels, which exposed
them to greater violence by skinheads.
The asylum debate and the SPD's decision to accept the constitutional amendment were
strongly influenced by subnational mobilization, especially by leaders of the southern states and
many mayors.  The Bavarian Interior Minister initiated the debate with a call for constitutional
amendment in 1991, and throughout 1991-1992, the CDU/CSU openly tried to pressure the SPD
by mobilizing state and local SPD politicians against asylum seekers.  Eventually many local
SPD leaders became vocal advocates of constitutional reform, including Georg Kronawitter, the
mayor of Munich.72  Pressure from the lower-level representatives and members of the SPD was
important in the SPD's change of position through a series of decisions in various party organs
during the Fall and Winter 1992-1993.73  Local politicians often came under pressure from
citizens initiatives which opposed the housing of asylum seekers in their neighborhoods, e.g. in
Saarlouis and Hanover.74
Finally, dramatic events against asylum seekers were crucial in the SPD's decision to
accept a constitutional amendment.  In three state elections held in 1991-1992, far-right parties
(the Republikaner and German People's Union) combined to win a surprising 7-12% of the vote
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by campaigning against asylum seekers.  The far right's success in two SPD-governed northern
states was especially shocking, since the SPD's leaders had previously viewed the far right as
largely a problem on the right flank of the CDU and CSU, especially in southern Germany.  Far-
right parties did well in the northern states largely because events within those states raised the
salience of the asylum issue:  in Bremen, the SPD's public switch in 1991 from an extremely
liberal asylum policy to a much more restrictive policy; and in Schleswig-Holstein, the squatting
of several churches by Kurdish asylum seekers and their allies from left-wing protest groups in
Winter 1991-1992.75  The far-right electoral successes gave new impetus to the asylum debate
and drove the SPD to seek a compromise with the center-right parties.
Popular riots and other anti-foreigner violence were widely interpreted as evidence that
public concern with the asylum issue was intense.  Adult German residents, who press and
politicians regarded as "normal citizens," joined skinheads in anti-foreigner riots in Hoyerswerda
(September 1991) and Rostock (August 1992).  The latter riots had a particularly profound effect
on the asylum debate and the SPD's switch in position.  The riots, together with government
unwillingness to repress anti-foreigner violence, provided pro-amendment forces with the
argument that asylum reform was needed in order to head off further violence.  For example, the
head of the Chancellor's office rejected the SPD's demands for special police units to protect
asylum seekers after the riots, on the grounds that it was pointless to "cure symptoms" when the
real problem was the legal right to asylum.76  In the wake of such statements, the SPD called an
emergency party meeting for mid-November, which accepted the need to amend Article 16.  The
federal government, led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU), did not call for a major crackdown
on anti-foreigner violence until after the murder of a Turkish guest-worker family in November
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1992.77
The riots in eastern Germany were caused by social-movement organizations which met
with favorable political opportunity structures at the local level, not primarily by economic
grievances.  In both riot cities, unemployment was below the average for eastern Germany, and
the foreign population was actually declining in Hoyerswerda.  Riots occurred because cultural
conflicts between foreign and German residents over matters such as noise and garbage were not
channelled into other forms of citizen participation, and police allowed violence to escalate.78 
The conditions necessary for anti-foreigner riots were quite uncommon, even in eastern
Germany; although asylum seekers were sent to about one hundred different counties and cities
in the eastern states, only five localities experienced riots on consecutive days, and only
Hoyerswerda, Rostock, and Quedlinburg had riots involving hundreds of adults.79
When authorities removed asylum seekers from the Hoyerswerda and Rostock
neighborhoods where they were attacked, this apparent capitulation to the rioters' demands
helped trigger attacks on foreigners in hundreds of locations in eastern and western Germany.80 
As a result, skinhead and neo-Nazi groups carried out 500 firebombings and 1500 other violent
crimes per year during 1991-1993, mostly against asylum seekers.81  The violence affected many
SPD-governed states more strongly than the center-right-governed southern states.82  The attacks
were widely reported, and the reports added urgency to the decision-making process within the
SPD.
Conclusions
To summarize, all five hypotheses concerning subnational mobilization and social
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movements were largely confirmed by the cases analyzed here.  First, the political processes
which mediate between socio-economic conditions and policies often have a life of their own. 
These processes led to restrictions in Britain at a time when the economy was nearly at full
employment and businesses needed black migrant labor.  Immigration rates increased
dramatically in Britain only because leading politicians responded to the London riots with loud
calls for immigration control.  Although asylum seekers burdened state governments in Germany,
ideological motivations were stronger than material interests for more than a decade, as only
some of the conservative states strongly opposed the liberal federal policy and the SPD-governed
states were unwilling to push for restrictions.  In defiance of the logic of ethnic competition, the
anti-immigrant backlash in Germany was strongly concentrated against asylum seekers, who
were not allowed to work or live in normal housing, rather than against the five million guest
workers and their families who were much more likely to compete with Germans for jobs and
apartments.
Second, state and local politicians, not national ones, were in the van of the anti-
immigration forces during the long periods in which the immigration-control issue developed
into a major political theme.  Mobilization by state or local elites preceded and influenced
national debates over restrictive policies in every case examined here, implying that the former
may be a necessary condition of strong and effective national mobilization for immigration
control.
Third, subnational politicians acted not purely on their own initiative, but rather under
pressure, or potential pressure, from social-movement organizations.  Social movements
involved a wide range of groups and activities, from respectable to disreputable, from voting to
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discussions to violence.  The underlying message often seemed to be the same:  the immigrants
already in the country were unwelcome, and additional immigration was unwanted.
Fourth, dramatic anti-immigrant events have major impacts on national politics because
national elites strain to read the public mood on immigration.  The timing of dramatic events
helps explain why controls on black immigration in Britain were adopted so early and at such
low levels of immigration and unemployment.  In Britain, anti-black rioting broke the liberal
consensus already in 1958, paving the way for local organizations to mobilize resolutions,
petition signatures, and votes for the anti-immigration cause.  The riots also set the tone for
national interpretations of later local events.  They made it more likely that the Conservative
Party would give strong weight to local party resolutions and petition signatures which
represented only a small minority of voters, and that the Labour Party would overinterpret the
Smethwick election result.
The incidence of dramatic events can also help explain why the constitutional asylum
right in Germany was abridged at a relatively late date and only after very large increases in
immigration and unemployment.  More than ten years of mobilizations against asylum rights by
the CSU and parts of the CDU failed to achieve relatively effective controls on asylum seekers
because suitable dramatic events were not available until the early 1990s.  Before 1991, violence
against asylum seekers was limited to a few small neo-Nazi organizations without support from
local residents.  The vague threat of dramatic events in Spring 1980 was enough to force visa and
employment restrictions that year, but not enough for the constitutional change sought by some
center-right party leaders.  The early 1990s were different, in that riots and far-right electoral
successes seemed to show that "normal citizens" finally were strongly concerned about asylum
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rights.  Even the SPD's more ideological activists and leaders, bitter at what seemed like
blackmail by the center-right parties and the far right, interpreted these local events to indicate a
pressing need for immigration controls.
Finally, these dramatic events were produced by social-movement organizations
operating in favorable local political environments, not simply by economic grievances.  Many
places in Western Europe have had immigrants and unemployment; only a very few have
experienced anti-immigrant riots or electoral victories by outrageously anti-immigrant
candidates.  The places which host such events present unusual combinations of organizations
and opportunities:  social-movement groups, sympathetic or blundering subnational elites, and
police who respond passively to anti-immigrant violence.  For these reasons, dramatic anti-
immigrant events are uncommon and not closely related to increases in immigration or
unemployment.  But when dramatic events occur, precisely their uncommonness makes them
frightening.  National politicians are prone to overinterpret them as expressions of more
widespread political processes which, they fear, may be emerging.
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